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Abstract 
The Cognitive Reflection Test, measuring intuition inhibition and cognitive reflection, has 
become extremely popular since it reliably predicts reasoning performance, decision-making and 
beliefs. Across studies, the response format of CRT items sometimes differs, assuming construct 
equivalence of the tests with open-ended vs. multiple choice items (the equivalence hypothesis). 
Evidence and theoretical reasons, however, suggest that the cognitive processes measured by 
these response formats and their associated performances might differ (the non-equivalence 
hypothesis). We tested the two hypotheses experimentally by assessing the performance in tests 
with different response formats and by comparing their predictive and construct validity. In a 
between-subjects experiment (n = 452), participants answered an open-ended, a two- or a four-
option response format of stem-equivalent CRT items and completed tasks on belief bias, 
denominator neglect and paranormal beliefs (benchmark indicators of predictive validity) as well 
as actively open-minded thinking and numeracy (benchmark indicators of construct validity). We 
found no significant differences between the three response formats in the number of correct 
responses, the number of intuitive responses (with the exception of the two-option version being 
higher than the other tests) and in the correlational patterns with the indicators of predictive and 
construct validity. All three test versions were similarly reliable but the multiple-choice formats 
were completed more quickly. We speculate that the specific nature of the CRT items helps to 
build construct equivalence among the different response formats. We recommend using the 
validated multiple-choice version of the CRT presented here, particularly the four-option CRT, 
for practical and methodological reasons.  
Keywords: Cognitive Reflection Test, cognitive reflection, construct equivalence, response 
formats, multiple-choice format 
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The Cognitive Reflection Test (hereafter, CRT) measures the ability to suppress a 
prepotent but incorrect intuitive answer and engage in cognitive reflection when solving a set of 
mathematical word problems (Frederick, 2005). The most famous CRT item is the “bat and ball” 
problem: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ___ cents.” Participants usually come up with an appealing intuitive yet 
incorrect answer – 10 cents – instead of the correct answer which requires more analytical 
processing and some formal computation – 5 cents. The test has become increasingly popular, 
yielding more than 2,000 citations 12 years after its publication on Google Scholar and has 
grown into the optimum measure of rational thinking (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). It 
gained popularity because it predicts an extensive array of variables, inter alia, biases in 
reasoning, judgment and decision-making (e.g., Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Frederick, 2005; 
Lesage, Navarrete, & De Neys, 2013; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Sirota, 
Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014; Toplak et al., 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014, 2017), 
real-life decision outcomes (Juanchich, Dewberry, Sirota, & Narendran, 2016), moral reasoning 
(Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015), paranormal beliefs and belief in God (Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016) and 
political beliefs (Deppe et al., 2015; but see Kahan, 2013). (For a review see Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a.) 
Critically, a lot of the research, whether correlational or experimental, has presented 
participants with its initial form – an open-ended answer format – so that participants have had to 
construct their responses (e.g., De Neys, Rossi, & Houde, 2013; Frederick, 2005; Johnson, 
Tubau, & De Neys, 2016; Liberali et al., 2012; Royzman, Landy, & Leeman, 2015; Sirota et al., 
2014; Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, & Aczel, 2017; Toplak et al., 2011). Sometimes, however, an ad 
COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST MCQ-2 & MCQ-4                                                            4 
hoc multiple-choice question version of the CRT has been used – most commonly a two- or four-
option format (e.g., Gangemi, Bourgeois-Gironde, & Mancini, 2015; Morsanyi, Busdraghi, & 
Primi, 2014; Oldrati, Patricelli, Colombo, & Antonietti, 2016; Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 
2016). In the latter approach, the equivalence between the open-ended and multiple-choice 
versions of the test has been implicitly assumed or explicitly claimed and similar processes have 
been inferred from these two types of tests. Indeed, if such equivalence has been achieved then 
using a validated multiple-choice version of the CRT would be more convenient since such a 
version would most likely be quicker to administer and code than the open-ended CRT. 
Furthermore, an automatic coding scheme would eliminate any potential coding ambivalence 
e.g., whether “0.05 cents”, a formally incorrect answer to a bat and ball problem, should count as 
an incorrect or correct answer on the assumption that participants mistook the unit in the answer 
for dollars instead of cents: i.e., “0.05 dollars”.  
There are several good empirical and theoretical reasons to expect differences according 
to the response formats of the Cognitive Reflection Test. First, evidence from educational 
measurement research points out the fact that despite a high correlation between open-ended 
(also called constructed) and multiple-choice versions, multiple choice tests usually lead to a 
better overall performance (e.g., Bridgeman, 1992; Rodriguez, 2003). Open-ended questions are 
more difficult to solve than multiple-choice ones for stem-equivalent items (i.e., that differ only 
by listing multiple choices), because presenting options enables a different array of cognitive 
strategies leading to increased performance (Bonner, 2013; Bridgeman, 1992). For instance, if 
participants generate an incorrect answer then a limited set of answers might provide 
unintentional feedback and eliminate that particular solution as a possible answer. With multiple-
choice questions, participants can use a backward strategy, where they pick up an answer listed 
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in the options and try to reconstruct the solution. Participants can also guess if they are uncertain 
about the options.  
Second, there might be theoretical reasons for non-equivalence of tests with different 
response formats, which could also be consequential. A cognitive conflict, which triggers deeper 
cognitive processing – according to several dual-process theories (De Neys, 2012, 2014; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2005) – might be more pronounced in the presence of an explicitly 
correct option and some other intuitively appealing but incorrect alternative option (Bhatia, 
2017). Thus, a multiple-choice version of the CRT might be easier because the explicit options 
trigger cognitive conflict with higher likelihood which, in turn, leads to easier engagement into 
cognitive reflection and becomes more strongly associated with the benchmark variables usually 
linked with the CRT requiring cognitive reflection (e.g., belief bias, paranormal beliefs, 
denominator neglect, actively open-minded thinking; Pennycook et al., 2012; Toplak et al., 
2014). Limited process-oriented evidence has indicated that a pronounced cognitive conflict was 
present when using a multiple-choice version of the CRT. The mouse trajectories of participants 
who responded correctly revealed that they were attracted to the incorrect intuitive response 
(Travers et al., 2016), whereas evidence of conflict was missing in the thinking aloud study using 
the open-ended version of the CRT (Szaszi et al., 2017). Clearly, other factors such as different 
sensitivity to conflict of the employed process-oriented methodologies might account for the 
difference, but the format response of the CRT remains a possible reason for this difference as 
well.  
In addition, even if people were equally likely to detect a conflict in the two different 
response formats and engage in reflective thinking afterwards, they might still fail to correct their 
initial intuition due to lack of mathematical knowledge (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 
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2015b). This is supported by the thinking aloud evidence, in which the performance in the CRT 
with the open-ended response format was partly explained by the lack of specific knowledge 
needed to solve the problem (Szaszi et al., 2017). Since the correct answer is already included in 
the multiple-choice version of the test, this particular format might therefore be easier. Another 
consequence could be that such a test would have a weaker association with numeracy compared 
with the open-ended CRT (Liberali et al., 2012). In other words, construct non-equivalence 
would implicate different cognitive processes taking place in the different formats of the CRT. 
These should result in different levels of performance and different correlational patterns with 
the benchmark variables usually associated with the CRT.  
 
The present research 
In the present experiment, our overarching aim was to test the construct equivalence of 
three different formats of the Cognitive Reflection Test (and its variations). To do so, we 
compared their means and correlational patterns with other typically predicted constructs. We 
did not opt for correlation between the different versions of the test because this does not 
necessarily represent equivalence of the underpinning cognitive processes that manifest 
themselves into the final scores. Specifically, we set up three main aims to fill in the gaps 
outlined above. First, we tested whether the CRT response format affects performance in the test, 
both in terms of reflectiveness score (i.e., correct responses) and intuitiveness score (i.e., 
appealing but incorrect responses). Second, we tested whether the CRT response format altered 
the well-established association between performance in the CRT and benchmark variables: 
belief bias, denominator neglect, paranormal beliefs, actively open-minded thinking and 
numeracy. Third, we tested the psychometric quality of the different formats of the tests by 
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comparing their internal consistency. In addition, and from a more practical perspective, we also 
had some expectations concerning time of completion. 
According to the construct equivalence hypothesis, which is assumed in the current 
research practices, (i) the effect of the answer format on the reflectiveness and intuitiveness 
scores will be negligible, (ii) the correlational patterns with outcome variables will not differ 
across the different test formats and (iii) the tests’ scores will have similar internal consistencies. 
In contrast, according to the construct non-equivalence hypothesis, which was derived from the 
mathematical problem-solving literature and based on other theoretical reasons, (i) multiple-
choice versions will lead to higher reflectiveness scores and lower intuitiveness scores due to 
employing a different array of more successful cognitive strategies, better chances of detecting 
cognitive conflict and/or better chances of identifying the correct response, (ii) the correlational 
patterns with outcome variables will differ across the different test formats – the multiple-choice 
test should better predict the predictive validity variables (belief bias, paranormal beliefs, 
denominator neglect), since they share similar processes and it will be less correlated with 
numeracy1 and (iii) the multiple-choice version will have a higher internal consistency in its 
summation score. Finally, we predicted that the multiple-choice version of the CRT would be 
quicker to complete compared with the open-ended version.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In other words, the tasks in which the answers are constructed (i.e., numeracy) should be less related 
with the multiple-choice version of the CRT, whereas the tasks in which one of the answers are selected 
(i.e., belief bias, denominator neglect) should be more aligned with the multiple-choice version of the 
CRT. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
We powered the experiment to detect a small-to-medium effect size (f = .17 ≅ ηp2 = 
0.03). Given α = .05 and β = .90 for a between-subjects ANOVA with three groups, such a 
power analysis resulted in a minimum required sample size of 441 participants (Cohen, 1988). 
Such a sample size would be sensitive enough to detect a medium effect size difference between 
two correlations (i.e., Cohen’s q ≈ 0.32). The participants were recruited from an online panel 
(Prolific Academic). Panel members were eligible to participate only when they fulfilled all four 
conditions: (i) their approval rate in previous studies was above 90%, (ii) they had not taken part 
in previous studies conducted by our lab in which we used the Cognitive Reflection Test, (iii) 
they were UK nationals and (iv) they resided in the UK. The first criterion aimed to minimise 
careless responding (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014), whereas the second criterion aimed to 
reduce familiarity with the items and the last two criteria aimed to guarantee a good level of 
English proficiency. The participants were reimbursed with £1.40 for their participation, which 
lasted, on average, 17 minutes. A total of 452 participants (with ages ranging from 18 to 72 
years, M = 37.0, SD = 12.3 years; 60.2% of whom were female) completed the questionnaire. 
The participants had various levels of education: less than high school (0.7%), high school 
(39.4%), undergraduate degree (44.2%), master’s degree (12.2%) and higher degrees such as 
PhD (3.5%). 
In a between-subjects design, the participants were randomly allocated to one of the three 
versions of the Cognitive Reflection Test and then answered items from the five benchmark 
tasks, which were presented in a random order. 
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Materials and Procedure 
Cognitive Reflection Test – response format manipulation. After giving informed 
consent, the participants solved the extended seven-item Cognitive Reflection Test, comprised of 
the original three items (Frederick, 2005) and four additional items (Toplak et al., 2014). The test 
was presented in one of the three test formats: (i) the original open-ended version, (ii) the two-
option multiple-choice version or (iii) the four-option multiple-choice version of the test. Each 
item was presented with the same stem and response format specific to the test format (see items 
in Supplementary Materials), for instance:    
“In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake?” 
(i) The open-ended version:  
      ____ days 
(ii) The two-option multiple choice version:  
□ 47 days  
□ 24 days 
(iii) The four-option multiple choice version: 
□ 47 days 
□ 24 days 
□ 12 days 
□ 36 days 
The two-option MCQ version always featured the correct and intuitive incorrect answers. 
The four-option MCQ version featured the correct and intuitive incorrect answers plus two other 
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incorrect answers that were found to be the most common incorrect answers after the intuitive 
incorrect answer in a previous study (Sirota, Kostovicova, Juanchich, Dewberry, & Marshall, 
manuscript). The presentation order of the CRT items, as well as the individual options in the 
MCQ versions of the test, was randomised for each participant. After solving the CRT, the 
participants then assessed the item familiarity of all of the CRT items presented in a random 
order: “Have you answered any of the following questions prior to taking this survey?”: Yes/No. 
The participants then answered three indicators of predictive validity: (i) belief bias, (ii) 
paranormal beliefs and (iii) denominator neglect, and two indicators of construct validity: (iv) 
open-mindedness beliefs and (v) numeracy.  
Belief Bias. The participants assessed the logical validity of the conclusion of eight 
syllogisms (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Markovits & Nantel, 1989). Each syllogism 
featured two premises and one conclusion. Four of the syllogisms had an unbelievable 
conclusion that followed logically from the two premises. For instance: “Premise 1: All things 
that are smoked are good for the health. Premise 2: Cigarettes are smoked. Conclusion: 
Cigarettes are good for the health.” The other four syllogisms featured a believable conclusion 
that did not follow logically from the premises. For instance: “Premise 1: All things that have a 
motor need oil. Premise 2: Automobiles need oil. Conclusion: Automobiles have motors.” The 
belief bias score had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .86). Correct responses were 
summed (+1 each) to create a belief bias score (0-8) with higher values indicating a stronger 
bias. 
Paranormal Beliefs. We assessed paranormal beliefs across different domains (e.g., 
witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism) with the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004). 
The participants expressed their agreement with 26 statements (e.g., “It is possible to 
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communicate with the dead”) on a 7-item Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Moderately 
Disagree, 3 = Slightly Disagree, 4 = Uncertain, 5 = Slightly Agree, 6 = Moderately Agree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree). The scale had excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.95). We 
averaged the participants’ responses (1-7), with higher values indicating stronger paranormal 
beliefs.  
Denominator Neglect. We used five scenarios describing a game of chance in which the 
participants could draw a single ticket from one of two bowls – a small bowl and a big bowl – 
each containing folded tickets (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Toplak et al., 2014). Small bowls 
feature a higher probability of winning and ratios with smaller denominators than big bowls. For 
instance, the small bowl contained 10 tickets with 1 winner ticket out of 10; therefore giving an 
11% chance of winning, whereas the large bowl contained 100 tickets with 8 winning tickets out 
of 100, giving an 8% chance of winning. Denominator neglect occurs when participants prefer to 
choose from the bigger bowl, not realising that the smaller bowl (with the smaller denominator) 
is actually more likely to have a winning ticket. The participants indicated which bowl they 
would prefer in a real-life situation in order to hypothetically win £8 on a 6-point Likert scale 
(ranging from 1: I would definitely pick from the small bowl, 2: I would pick from the small 
bowl, 3: I would probably pick from the small bowl, 4: I would probably pick from the large 
bowl, 5: I would pick from the large bowl, 6: I would definitely pick from the large bowl). The 
ratios of winning to losing tickets in the small and big bowls were the same as those used in 
Toplak et al. (2014): 1:10 vs. 8 in 100, 1:4 vs. 19:81, 1:19 vs. 4:96, 2:3 vs. 19:31 and 3:12 vs. 
18:82. The answers had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .80). The ratings in the five 
scenarios were averaged (ranging from 1 to 6) with higher values indicating a stronger tendency 
to neglect denominators. 
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Open-Minded Thinking. We used the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Beliefs Scale to 
measure beliefs about open-mindedness (Baron, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1997). The 
participants expressed their agreement with 11 statements (e.g., “People should revise their 
beliefs in response to new information or evidence”) on a 5-point Likert scale (anchored at 1 = 
Completely Disagree, 5 = Completely Agree). The scale had good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .79). Average scores with higher values indicated stronger beliefs in open-
minded thinking. 
Numeracy. We used the Lipkus Numeracy Scale, perhaps the most commonly used 
measure of numeracy in this area (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001). The measure consists of 11 
simple mathematical tasks, which tap into general numeracy, including understanding of basic 
probability concepts, ability to convert percentages to proportions and ability to compare 
different risk magnitudes, (e.g., “The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 
people, about how many of them are expected to get infected?”) The scale had satisfactory 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .65). The participants’ correct answers were summed (0-11) 
so higher scores indicated higher numeracy. 
Finally, the participants answered some socio-demographic questions (age, gender and 
education level) and were debriefed. We conducted the study in accordance with the ethical 
standards of the American Psychological Association. We have reported all the measures in the 
study, all the manipulations, any data exclusions and the sample size determination rule. 
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Results 
Effect of test response format on performance 
The percentage of correct and intuitive incorrect responses, as well as item difficulty, 
item discrimination and item-total correlations, looked very similar across the three formats of 
the seven-item CRT (Tables 1 and 2). Overall, the participants correctly answered a similar 
number of problems in all the test versions of the seven-item CRT (Figure 1, panel A). We found 
no statistically significant differences between these three formats in the number of correctly 
solved problems, F(2, 449) = 0.31, p = .733, η2p < .01. A Bayesian analysis, using a BayesFactor 
R package and default priors (Morey & Rouder, 2015), yielded strong evidence (evidence 
categorization as recommended in Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014) to support the model, assuming 
the null format effect relative to the model assuming the format effect, BF01 = 30.3. The effect of 
format on reflectiveness score remained non-significant when we entered the familiarity with the 
items as the covariate, F(2, 448) = 0.27, p = .271, η2p < .01 and the effect of familiarity was also 
non-significant, F(1, 448) = 1.73, p = .190, η2p < .01. Bayesian analysis including the same 
covariate (as a nuisance term) yielded strong evidence to support the model assuming the null 
format effect relative to the model assuming the format effect, BF01 = 31.2. The robustness of the 
findings was tested against a six-item version of the CRT, which did not include the seventh item 
which featured a three-choice option in the original open-ended version of the CRT. The 
conclusion remained the same: there was no detectable format effect between the open-ended, 
two-option and four-option formats of the six-item CRT (M1 = 2.8, M2 = 3.1, M3 = 2.8, 
respectively; SD1 = 2.1, SD2 = 1.8, SD3 = 1.9, respectively), F(2, 449) = 0.86, p = .426, η2p < .01, 
and strong evidence for relative support of the null effect model relative to the alternative model, 
BF01 = 18.2.  
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The participants also correctly answered a similar number of problems in all the test 
versions of the original three-item CRT (Figure 1, panel C). The format effect was not 
statistically significant, F(2, 449) = 1.19, p = .306, η2p = .01, and we found strong evidence 
supporting the model assuming no effect relative to the effect, BF01 = 13.4. The null effect on 
reflectiveness score remained when we controlled for familiarity of the items, F(2, 448) = 1.08, p 
= .342, η2p = .01 (there was a non-significant effect of familiarity, F(1, 448) = 1.21, p = .273, η2p 
< .01). We found strong evidence to support the model assuming the null format effect 
(including the covariate as a nuisance term) relative to the model assuming the format effect, 
BF01 = 15.2. Thus, the evidence found here clearly supports the hypothesis of construct 
equivalence. 
 
Table 1: Correct, intuitive incorrect and, if applicable, other incorrect responses across three 
versions of the Cognitive Reflection Test. 
 CRT open  CRT 2 ch  CRT 4 ch 
 Correct Intuit. Other  Correct Intuit.  Correct Intuit. Other  
Item 1 39.5% 56.5% 4.1%  29.0% 71.0%  38.0% 60.0% 2.0% 
Item 2 49.7% 35.4% 15.0%  66.5% 33.5%  48.7% 37.3% 14.0% 
Item 3 61.2% 29.9% 8.8%  61.3% 38.7%  50.7% 38.0% 11.3% 
Item 4 49.0% 23.8% 27.2%  59.4% 40.6%  56.7% 26.7% 16.7% 
Item 5 42.2% 40.8% 17.0%  54.2% 45.8%  46.7% 41.3% 12.0% 
Item 6 42.2% 40.1% 17.7%  36.1% 63.9%  39.3% 36.0% 24.7% 
Item 7 67.3% 28.6% 4.1%  56.8% 43.2%  64.0% 29.3% 6.7% 
Note. CRT open = the original open-ended version of the CRT, CRT 2 ch = the multiple-choice 
version of the CRT with two response options, CRT 4 ch = the multiple-choice version of the 
CRT with four response options; correct = % of correct responses, intuitive = % of intuitive 
incorrect responses, other = % of other (non-intuitive) incorrect responses. 
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Table 2: Item difficulty, discrimination and item-total correlation for the three response formats 
of the Cognitive Reflection Test (correct responses). 
 
 Item Difficulty  
(M) 
 Item Discrimination 
(rpbs) 
 Item-total correlation 
(r) 
 CRT 
open 
CRT 
2 ch 
CRT  
4 ch 
 CRT 
open 
CRT 
2 ch 
CRT  
4 ch 
 CRT 
open 
CRT 
2 ch 
CRT  
4 ch 
Item 1 0.39 0.29 0.38  0.76 0.71 0.76  0.69 0.69 0.67 
Item 2 0.50 0.66 0.49  0.90 0.65 0.72  0.76 0.60 0.62 
Item 3 0.61 0.61 0.51  0.86 0.76 0.76  0.75 0.66 0.62 
Item 4 0.49 0.59  0.57  0.82 0.69 0.72  0.70 0.54 0.64 
Item 5 0.42 0.54 0.47  0.78 0.82 0.78  0.69 0.70 0.68 
Item 6 0.42 0.36 0.39  0.57 0.45 0.38  0.53 0.47 0.41 
Item 7 0.67 0.57 0.64  0.55 0.73 0.64  0.52 0.68 0.56 
Note. CRT open = the original open-ended version of the CRT, CRT 2 ch = the multiple-choice 
version of the CRT with two response options, CRT 4 ch = the multiple-choice version of the 
CRT with four response options. 
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Figure 1. Effect of three different CRT formats on the number of (A) correct responses in the 
seven-item CRT, (B) intuitive (incorrect) responses in the seven-item CRT, and on the number of 
(C) correct responses in the three-item CRT, (B) intuitive (incorrect) responses in the three-item 
CRT.  
Note. Each graph represents individual data points, density and the mean (middle bold line) and 
its 95% CI (box borders).  
   
We observed more variability in the number of intuitive responses across the different 
test formats of the seven-item CRT, with the two-option test giving rise to higher numbers of 
intuitive answers (Figure 1, panel C). We found a significant effect of the response format, F(2, 
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449) = 7.47, p < .001, η2p = .03, and strong evidence to support the model assuming the format 
effect relative to the no effect model, BF10 = 25.4. The two-option CRT yielded more intuitive 
responses than the open-ended CRT, t = 3.59, p < .001, and more than the four-option CRT, t = 
3.01, p < .001, but there was no difference between the open-ended CRT and the four-option 
CRT, t = -0.59, p = .825. (All the p-values used Tukey’s adjustment.) The effect of format on 
intuitiveness score was stable even when we controlled for the familiarity of the items, F(2, 448) 
= 7.49, p < .001, η2p = .03, while familiarity did not have a significant effect, F(1, 448) = 1.38, p 
= .241, η2p < .01. The format effect was further corroborated by strong relative evidence, BF10 = 
27.3. The pattern of results was the same when item seven was removed from the averages of the 
open-ended CRT, the two-option CRT and the four-option CRT (M1 = 2.3, M2 = 2.9, M3 = 2.4, 
respectively; SD1 = 1.7, SD2 = 1.8, SD3 = 1.7, respectively). The effect of the format was still 
significant, F(2, 449) = 6.30, p = .002, η2p = .03, and we found moderate evidence to support the 
model assuming the format effect, BF10 = 8.7. 
 However, we did not find a significant increase in the number of intuitive answers across 
the test formats in the original three-item CRT, F(2, 449) = 1.50, p = .224, η2p = .01 (Figure 1, 
panel D). The data provided strong relative evidence to support the null format effect model, 
BF01 = 10.0. The null effect of format on intuitiveness score remained non-significant when we 
controlled for familiarity of the items, F(2, 448) = 1.40, p = .247, η2p = .01. There was a non-
significant effect of familiarity, F(1, 448) = 2.90, p = .089, η2p = .01 and it was supported by 
strong relative evidence, BF10 = 11.4. 
 
Effect of test response format on validity 
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The construct equivalence hypothesis predicted that the correlational pattern of the 
correct and intuitive CRT responses with belief bias, paranormal beliefs and denominator neglect 
as predictive validity variables, and with actively open-minded thinking and numeracy as 
construct validity variables, would be similar across the three test formats. Overall, in terms of 
expected direction and strength, as indicated by the confidence intervals in Figure 2, we observed 
that all the correlations were significantly different from zero, with one exception being the non-
significant correlation between the intuitive responses from the seven-item open-ended CRT and 
paranormal beliefs (Figure 2). We observed only small correlational variations between the three 
test formats of the seven-item and the three-item CRT and the predicted variables (Figure 2, 
panels A and C). The four-option format followed by the two-option format sometimes yielded 
higher correlations than the open-ended format, e.g., most notably for the belief bias: -.52 and -
0.51 vs. -.36 (Figure 2, panel A), but in other tasks, such as denominator neglect, the correlations 
were remarkably similar to each other. We tested the differences between correlations using a 
series of z-tests adjusted for multiple comparisons (given three tests in each test, we used a 
Bonferroni adjustment, which decreased alpha error from .05 to 0.017), using the cocor R 
package (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015). None of the differences between the correlations 
reached statistical significance (see Table 3). In other words, the different formats of the CRT 
predicted the outcome variables to a similar extent. 
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Figure 2. Effect of three different CRT formats on the correlational patterns with predictive 
validity variables and a confounding variable of numeracy on (A) the correct responses in the 
seven-item CRT, (B) the intuitive (incorrect) responses in the seven-item CRT, and on the 
number of (C) correct responses in the three-item CRT and (B) intuitive (incorrect) responses in 
the three-item CRT.  
Note. Each horizontal error bar represents a point estimate of Pearson correlation coefficient (r) 
and its 95% CI.  
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Table 3: Differences between correlational patterns between the open-ended and multiple-choice 
versions of the CRT with indicators of predictive and construct validity. 
 CRT 7-item 
Correct Res. 
CRT 7-item 
Intuitive Res. 
CRT 3-item 
Correct Res. 
CRT 3-item 
Intuitive Res. 
 z-test p z-test p z-test p z-test p 
 
Belief Bias 
        
CRT open vs. CRT 2 choices 1.66 0.097 -2.10 0.035 0.43 0.666 -0.61 0.540 
CRT open vs. CRT 4 choices 1.74 0.082 -1.67 0.095 0.79 0.430 -0.52 0.605 
CRT 2 choices vs. CRT 4 choices 0.10 0.923 0.42 0.672 0.37 0.715 0.09 0.926 
 
Denominator Neglect         
CRT open vs. CRT 2 choices -0.95 0.342 0.28 0.777 -0.60 0.548 -0.13 0.899 
CRT open vs. CRT 4 choices -0.34 0.731 -0.03 0.975 -0.14 0.888 0.02 0.980 
CRT 2 choices vs. CRT 4 choices 0.61 0.544 -0.32 0.752 0.46 0.645 0.15 0.879 
 
Paranormal Beliefs         
CRT open vs. CRT 2 choices 0.93 0.351 -1.43 0.153 1.40 0.161 -1.91 0.056 
CRT open vs. CRT 4 choices 1.09 0.277 -1.37 0.172 0.98 0.327 -0.95 0.340 
CRT 2 choices vs. CRT 4 choices 0.17 0.869 0.05 0.958 -0.41 0.679 0.95 0.341 
 
Open Mindedness          
CRT open vs. CRT 2 choices 0.32 0.747 -0.01 0.994 1.01 0.314 -0.43 0.669 
CRT open vs. CRT 4 choices -0.30 0.763 0.24 0.812 0.35 0.724 -0.08 0.933 
CRT 2 choices vs. CRT 4 choices -0.63 0.529 0.25 0.804 -0.65 0.514 0.34 0.730 
 
Numeracy         
CRT open vs. CRT 2 choices 0.53 0.596 1.13 0.257 0.71 0.475 0.75 0.451 
CRT open vs. CRT 4 choices -0.70 0.482 1.45 0.146 0.36 0.723 0.45 0.655 
CRT 2 choices vs. CRT 4 choices -1.25 0.213 0.33 0.739 -0.36 0.721 -0.30 0.761 
Note. A Bonferroni adjustment was used, thus α = .05/3 = .017 
 
Effect of test response format on internal consistency 
All three response formats of the seven-item CRT – open-ended, two-option and four-
option – had good internal consistency for the reflectiveness score, α = 0.79, 95% CI [0.74, 
0.84], α = 0.73, 95% CI [0.66, 0.79] and α = 0.71, 95% CI [0.63, 0.78], respectively. We did not 
find significant differences between these three alphas, χ2(2) = 3.29, p = .193 (using the "cocron" 
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R package, Diedenhofen & Musch, 2016). Similarly, no differences were detected for the 
intuitiveness scores, α = 0.68, 95% CI [0.59, 0.75], α = 0.73, 95% CI [0.66, 0.79], α = 0.64, 95% 
CI [0.54, 0.72], respectively, which was not significantly different, χ2(2) = 2.36, p = .307.  
The internal consistencies of the three-item CRT were also similar across the response 
formats. The internal consistencies of the reflectiveness score were not statically significant to 
each other, α = 0.73, 95% CI [0.64, 0.80], α = 0.61, 95% CI [0.49, 0.71], α = 0.60, 95% CI [0.47, 
0.70], χ2(2) = 3.72, p = .156. This was the case for the intuitiveness score as well: α = 0.67, 95% 
CI [0.57, 0.75], α = 0.61, 95% CI [0.49, 0.71], α = 0.58, 95% CI [0.45, 0.68], χ2(2) = 1.15, p = 
.563. Thus, any differences in the correlational pattern would be less likely to be due to 
differences in internal consistency of the scales. 
Effect of test response format on completion time 
 Finally, we looked at the time taken to complete the three-format version of the CRT. As 
expected, the open-ended CRT (M = 5.9, SD = 4.0, Mdn = 4.8, IQR = 3.9 minutes) took 
substantially more time to complete than the two and four-option CRTs (M = 3.5, SD = 1.5, Mdn 
= 3.2, IQR = 2.0 minutes; M = 4.5, SD = 2.6, Mdn = 3.8, IQR = 2.8 minutes, respectively). A 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test (used due to data skewness), confirmed that the difference 
was statistically significant, χ2(2) = 44.71, p < .001. The open-ended CRT took longer than the 
two-option test, Mann-Whitney U = 6352, p < .001, and longer than the four-option CRT, Mann-
Whitney U = 8490, p = .001. The four-option CRT took longer than the two-option CRT, Mann-
Whitney U = 9067, p = .001. Thus, multiple-choice versions of the CRT are much quicker to 
complete without compromising the predictive validity of the tests. 
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Discussion 
In a well-powered experiment, we found that different test response formats – open-
ended, two-option and four-option – did not significantly affect the number of correct responses 
in the original three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) or in its seven-item 
extension (Toplak et al., 2014). Overall, the response format did not alter the number of intuitive 
responses, except in the case of the two-option format of the seven-item CRT, which yielded a 
higher rate of intuitive responses than the open-ended and four-option formats. This could be due 
to the presence of more prominent intuitive options. Furthermore, we found no detectable 
differences in the pattern of correlations of the test with benchmark indicators of predictive and 
construct validity – belief bias, denominator neglect, paranormal beliefs, actively open-minded 
thinking and numeracy. Finally, all three formats had similar internal consistency of the items 
regardless of the type of scoring (reflectiveness vs. intuitiveness). Overall, these findings favour 
the construct equivalence hypothesis over the non-equivalence hypothesis. 
Our findings are surprising in the context of the literature of mathematical word problems 
and educational testing because, in those fields, multiple-choice questions have been shown to be 
easier to solve than open-ended questions (e.g., Bonner, 2013; Bosch-Domenech, Branas-Garza, 
& Espin, 2014). This might be because of the specific nature of the CRT items. The strategies 
believed to be responsible for better performance in multiple-choice mathematical problems – 
such as corrective feedback, guessing or backwards solutions (Bonner, 2013; Bridgeman, 1992) 
– might not work so well when an intuitively appealing but incorrect answer is provided. For 
instance, it seems less likely that participants would resort to guessing when there is an appealing 
intuitive option available. Similarly, corrective feedback relies on generating an answer, which is 
not in the offered set of possible answers and therefore such an item offers unintentional 
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feedback. However, there is little benefit from corrective feedback if the intuitive incorrect 
answer and the correct answer are the two most generated answers. Our findings therefore 
indicate that the three versions of the CRT capture similar processes.  
Methodologically speaking, we created and validated four new measures of cognitive 
reflection: two-option and four-option three-item CRTs as well as the equivalent of the extended 
version, two-option and four-option seven-item CRTs. The four-option versions seemed 
particularly well suited for use in both experimental and correlational research. They offer the 
same level of difficulty, similar internal consistency and the same predictive power as the open-
ended version of the CRT (in fact, the four-option CRT was nominally the best ranked predictor 
among the formats), whilst being substantially quicker for participants to answer. In addition, 
coding the answers can be completely automated, which saves time for the researchers and 
eliminates coding ambivalence, which may lead to coding errors. The overall additional financial 
cost is not trivial due to its cumulative nature. For example, Prolific Academic, which is one of 
the cheapest panel providers in the UK, currently charges an additional £0.20 for roughly 100 
seconds of additional time for each participant, which is the additional time associated with using 
the open version of the CRT compared with the four-option version. This represents an 
additional £100 for a study with 500 participants (similar to a study presented here). In addition 
to this cost, if one were to employ a research assistant to code those 3,500 answers of the open 
CRT for three hours, this would cost an additional £60. Hence, running a single study with the 
open CRT compared with the four-option CRT would be £160 more expensive. If one were to 
run three studies in one manuscript, this would add up to £480 (i.e., one new study).  
The argument regarding the coding ambiguity is not negligible either. For example, in the 
bat and ball problem, the correct answer is supposed to be indicated in pence (cents in the 
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US)____ and hence it should be “5”. But is “0.05” also a correct answer or not? Is “£0.05” a 
correct response? A strict coding scheme would not classify such answers to be correct responses 
even though, clearly, they are not reasoning errors and should be – in our view – coded as 
correct. There are no coding instructions in the original paper, nor a standardised coding practice 
regarding this test, and one can rarely see any details provided on coding of the CRT in other 
papers. So, there are obvious degrees of freedom in deciding on a coding scheme for the open 
answers in the CRT and it is not obvious what exactly constitutes the correct response. To 
illustrate the extent of the difference, in our research reported here, when we followed the strict 
coding for the bat and ball problem (n = 147), around 10% (6 out of 58) of the originally correct 
answers were recoded as “other incorrect” and around 11% (9 out of 83) of the originally 
intuitive answers were recoded as “other incorrect” responses; a significant change in absolute 
performance according to a marginal homogeneity test, p < .001. The automatic coding of a 
multiple-choice version of the CRT eliminates this problem and would allow the CRT 
performance in future studies to be more comparable.  
The two-option versions of the test are appropriate too. However, the seven-item CRT 
yielded a higher number of intuitive responses without compromising predictive patterns; this 
might have consequences for researchers for whom the average absolute level of intuitive 
responses is important. Future research should consider whether different cognitive processes are 
involved when response formats vary in stem-equivalent judgment and decision-making tasks. 
For instance, one could wonder whether the process and performance is the same behind the 
base-rate fallacy: whereas constructed responses are used in the textbook version of Bayesian 
reasoning tasks (e.g., Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015), multiple-choice 
questions are used in the stereotypical base-rate problems (e.g., De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 
COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST MCQ-2 & MCQ-4                                                            25 
2011). 
 Three limitations of our research require more discussion and should be addressed in 
future research. First, we have shown that the response formats did not alter predictive and 
construct validity, as indicated by the benchmark variables, and even though our selection of 
such variables captures different cognitive domains, it is not exhaustive. Future research should 
explore other outcome variables and see whether response format would yield any changes to the 
predictive and construct validity. Second, even though the format did not alter the performance 
or predictive patterns, clearly validity and reliability of multiple-choice versions of the CRT 
depend on the multiple-choice construction of the test. Here, we adopted a transparent and 
consistent procedure according to which two remaining options were the most common incorrect 
(non-intuitive) responses generated by the participants in other studies. Changes in the provided 
choices (the four-option version) might affect the construct equivalence, e.g., adding an 
additional appealing incorrect answer could increase cognitive conflict and subsequent cognitive 
engagement (Bhatia, 2017). Therefore, in terms of future research, we would recommend the use 
of multiple-choice tests that have been validated (see Supplementary Materials and 
https://osf.io/mzhyc/ for quick implementation) or, in the case of ad hoc development, we would 
advise at least testing the construct equivalence of new multiple-choice versions. In addition, as 
pointed out by our reviewer, it is also possible to imagine the construct non-equivalence 
hypothesis in the opposite direction. For example, one could argue that the open-ended version 
of the CRT is better at testing the spontaneous detection of an incorrect intuition, which might be 
the reason why the CRT predicts the predictive validity task. Even though we did not find 
supportive evidence for such a direction of the non-equivalence hypothesis, future research 
should consider this possibility when further testing the construct non-equivalence hypothesis. 
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Finally, even though we used a sample based on the general adult population, generally speaking 
this was a relatively well-educated sample; it is still possible that in low educated samples the 
test formats would play a significant role and future research should address this possibility 
empirically. 
Conclusion 
We developed and validated a multiple-choice version (with two and four options) of the 
three-item (Frederick, 2005) and seven-item Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak et al., 2014). We 
have shown that the response format did not affect the perfomance, predictive patterns or 
psychometric properties of the test. Prior research used various response formats whilst assuming 
construct equivalence of these tests. Our findings are aligned with such an assumption. We 
recommend the use of the four-option multiple-choice version of the test in future correlational 
and experimental research because it saves time and eliminates coding errors without losing its 
predictive power.  
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